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There are several reasons why adolescence is interesting. It is in this phase that an
individual finds herself fully facing the external world: basically equipped with the kind of
social cognition that s/he has acquired at home, at school and through the media during
childhood, s/he has now to meet a host of other, diverse views of what “reasonable,”
“appropriate,” or “expected” courses of thought and emotions are, in the wild with friends
and peers, romantic or sexual partners, teachers and employers, and the society at large.
Furthermore, she is also expected, both at home and in the external world, to have a
wholly new degree of control over such courses. While the idea that the development
of social cognition still progresses after infancy (and possibly throughout the life span)
is clearly gaining consensus in the field, the literature building on it is still scarce. One
of the reasons for this probably is that most tests used to study it focus on its basic
component, namely theory of mind, and have been mostly devised for us with children;
therefore, they are not suitable to deal with the hugely increasing complexity of social
and mental life during adolescence and adulthood. Starting from a review of the literature
available, we will argue that the development of social cognition should be viewed as
a largely yet-to-be-understood mix of biological and cultural factors. While it is widely
agreed upon that the very initial manifestations of social life in the newborn are largely
driven by an innate engine with which all humans are equally endowed, it is also evident
that each culture, and each individual within it, develops specific adult versions of social
cognition.
Keywords: adolescence, social cognition, theory of mind, mindreading, metacognition, self-reflection,
development
Introduction
There are several reasons why adolescence—and, more to the point, social life and social cognition
in adolescence—is scientifically interesting. It is during this period that an individual finds herself1
fully facing the external world: basically equipped with the social competences that she has acquired
at home, at school and through the media during childhood, she has now to meet a host of other,
1Throughout the paper we will use either the feminine or the masculine when referring to unspecified human beings.
This is only made for the sake of readability and is not meant to convey any gender-related position or the idea that
there may or may not be differences in social cognition between genders. However important, such themes are simply
not relevant on the level of abstraction on which our arguments are cast.
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views of what “reasonable,” “appropriate,” or “expected” courses
of thought and emotions are, in the wild with friends and peers,
romantic or sexual partners, teachers and employers, and the
society at large. Furthermore, she is also expected, both at home
and in the external world, to have a new degree of control over
such courses.
Substantially analogous considerations hold when social
cognition is viewed in its reflective aspects, that is as a means
of self-knowledge. Again, adolescence is a crucial phase in the
development of an individual’s understanding of herself, of her
own feelings and desires, her own ways of reasoning, her own
reactions to external as well as internal situations, etc. And, again,
both the need and the actual ability to control these courses of
thought and emotions change greatly during this period.
However, the literature on social cognition in adolescence is
scarce and scattered, particularly if compared with other ages of
life, like infancy and childhood, or other domains of cognition: few
empirical studies are available and there is no unitary theoretical
framework within which to understand them.
Yet, a better understanding of adolescence would be crucial,
if only because a quantitatively impressive part of human kind
currently falls within such period. The present generation of
people aged 10–24 years is the largest in history: at 1.8 billion,
it comprises a quarter of the world’s population. Nearly 90%
of them live in low- or middle-income countries where, due to
higher fertility rates, they constitute a far greater proportion of the
population than in high-income countries (WHO, 2009).
Still another reason of interest is that several disorders—first
and foremost, schizophrenia or substance abuse, but also mood
and anxiety-related dysfunctions—have their onset or witness an
increase during adolescence and early adulthood.
This makes it all the more interesting to understand what
social cognition is in this phase of life, at least within the widely
diffused theoretical framework that views a crucial aspect of social
cognition, namely theory of mind (ToM), as crucially involved in
these disorders (Frith, 1992; for reviews, see Bosco et al., 2009a,
and respectively, Bosco et al., 2014a).
This paper will discuss social cognition in adolescence. We will
include both a review of the literature available and a theoretical
discussion. We are aware that adolescence is, at least in part,
a social construction, and that its features may vary between
different sociocultural and historical therefore, we will do our
best to keep our arguments on a sufficiently general level to allow
for these differences. Yet, we are also aware that we are Western
researchers, like most of our peers, and that this puts inescapable
biases in our analyses.
From Childhood to Adolescence
The social world is the most important realm of interaction of
human beings, that within which we spend the whole of our lives.
Even when we are alone with ourselves, be it at home or during a
walk in themountains, we are immersed in an environment which
is more or less completely made of social artifacts and products;
even more crucially, our thoughts and feelings, as well as our
actions, are largely shaped by (and generally aimed at) the social
world (Clancey, 1997).
Unsurprisingly, a great deal of effort has been devoted within
the psychological sciences to investigating into the nature of
human social cognition, its evolution in the species and its
development in the individual.
As far as phylogeny is concerned, starting from pioneering
research on so-called “Machiavellian intelligence” (e.g.,
Humphrey, 1976; Byrne and Whiten, 1985; Dunbar, 1993),
it has been claimed that social cognition is at the very root of
the particular evolution of the primates’ mind. Technology and a
sophisticated use of artifacts would have played less important a
role, at least until the appearance of the first hominins, since when
the evolution of material cognition appears to have paralleled a
further evolution of social cognition. The social life of humans,
like that of the other great apes, is highly complex: they form
long-term social relationship with others, understand the social
relationship among third parties, and recognize that the actions
of individuals are driven by their goals and by their perception of
the situation (Tomasello and Vaish, 2013).
The phrase social cognition generally refers to “the various
psychological processes that enable individuals to take advantage
of being part of a social group” (Frith, 2008, p. 2033). It is crucial
to put an emphasis on words like cognition and phrases like to
make sense, which allow to keep social cognition proper as distinct
from the mere influence that an individual’s behavior may or may
not have on the behavior of other individuals (Bara and Tirassa,
2010), something which instead is universal in animals and even
in plants.
An important facet of social cognition in primates is the
ability to understand the mental states of other individuals,
including their intentions, desires and beliefs, i.e., what is called
ToM, mentalizing, or folk psychology (Davies and Stone, 1995;
Nichols and Stich, 2003; Goldman, 2006; Blakemore et al., 2007;
Hutto et al., 2011). Together with other sophisticated cognitive
competences like social emotional processing (Burnett et al.,
2009), this capacity enables an individual to understand, explain
and predict another individual’s actions and thus also allows
for the negotiation of complex interpersonal decisions (Crone,
2013). Social cognitive processes include also basic perceptual
processes such as face processing (Farroni et al., 2005), biological
motion detection (Pelphrey and Carter, 2008), and joint attention
(Carpenter et al., 1998).
It is not completely understood if, or to what extent, this
particular type of social cognition belongs to species other
than ours (Heyes, 1998): it appears, however, that ToM-like
competences are more widely diffused among primates than what
is commonly thought (Tomasello, 2014). What can safely be
said is that, while the social life of great apes is mainly about
competition, human societies are vastly more and distinctively
structured around and for cooperation (Tomasello and Vaish,
2013), which of course founds on the further evolution of peculiar
cognitive competences, among which our special kind of social
cognition. In a word, the social life of humans is largely a matter
of intersubjectivity or sharedness (Premack and Premack, 1994;
Tirassa, 1999; Tirassa and Bosco, 2008).
As regards ontogeny, there is now a remarkable amount of
empirical literature in psychology describing the first years of
development of social cognition and mindreading. This body
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of literature is far from yielding a univocal sense of what a
child’s social cognition is or how it develops: rather, it appears
to be a multidimensional, highly complex patchwork of different
subareas, different theoretical or empirical approaches, and,
necessarily, different results.
Most proposals in this area subscribe to a common
philosophical framework defined by a set of core assumptions,
namely, as stated above, that the primary function of social
cognition is to predict, explain, and control the actions of the
others, which is made possible by the attribution, and hence the
representation, of their mental states. The big issue is whether
such attributions are achieved by means of theoretical inference,
simulative analogy, or a bit of both (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008;
Hutto et al., 2011).
Furthermore, as Hutto et al. (2011) argue, most theories
tacitly assume that human adults entertain a fully developed
mindreading; consequently, the main question concerns the
extent to which the mentalizing abilities of infants (if and when
they indeed have any) might compare to those of the adult.
However, there is a substantial lack of cognitive models of
mindreading in adults (see the review in Apperly, 2013) or of what
the phrase a fully developed mindreading could precisely mean.
Gallagher (2006) notes that ToM approaches to the explanation
of how we come to understand others typically are abstract
(third-person when they need to be second-person), mentalistic
(starting with the supposition that there are things like minds,
beliefs, desires that we have no access to in others, and sometimes
even in ourselves), and biased toward theoretical reason (when
practical, situated reason is a better way to go: see also Bosco
et al., 2009b). Overly intellectualizing what is involved in our
basic encounters with others, they tend to forget emotion and
our ability to read it not in the minds of others, but on their
faces, as well as in their gestures and expressive movements. Yet,
if the basic ontology of human social competence is the same
from the very beginning of mental life (as has been claimed,
e.g., by Tirassa et al., 2006a,b), a more situated, more embodied
approach to social cognition should be developed, allowing the
more rationally sophisticated abilities to be a precious tool that
comes into play when it is necessary rather than the only nature of
human intersubjectivity.
These problems notwithstanding, there can be little doubt that
crucial advancements in our understanding of the ontogeny of
social cognition have been achieved in the last few decades from
which knowledge is likely to proceed further, though probably still
without a unitary theoretical framework in the foreseeable future.
Much less is known about the ways and directions in which
social cognition develops after infancy: despite the increasing
interest in social cognition beyond childhood (e.g., Valle et al.,
2015) knowledge of how it works in the adult or possibly decays
in the elderly still is scarce and scattered. There are several
possible explanations for this situation (Dumontheil et al., 2010).
Firstly, the tasks that have been used to test ToM in early
development are not appropriate for testing older children and
adolescents. Since most ToM tasks are passed by 5-years-olds,
ceiling effects might be obscuring the observation of any further
development. Secondly, tasks typically enquire directly children’s
representations of another person’s mental states; they do not tap
into how ToM is used to drive decisions and actions in everyday
life.
When a situated framework is adopted, further problems pop
up. One is that only one-to-one interactions are normally studied,
and even these are framed in terms of a subject who is asked
to observe and explain another individual’s behavior, rather than
truly encountering him; that is, only a third-person perspective,
instead of a second-person one, is adopted in practice. Another
problem is that only real-time (vs. retrospective), status-free,
culture-free interactions are taken into account, thus obliterating
most of the complexities of real social life. Not only does the
study of ToM in adolescence and early adulthood constitute a
methodological challenge, insofar as it requires the creation of
new empirical tasks fit to capture age differences (Henry et al.,
2013; Moran, 2013; Valle et al., 2015): it also calls for a radical
enrichment of the underlying theoretical frameworks.
Still another problem is that the ToM tasks that are normally
used with children tend to impose rigid requirements on what
the “right” answer is. This might be a reasonable choice, insofar
as it can be assumed that all children—or, at least, all children of
Western heritage—will basically follow the same developmental
trajectories. It is less obvious, however, that the same may be the
case of adults. Here, itmight be said, “mindreader is asmindreader
does”: there is no need to assume that a plateau should exist as
the final state of the ontogeny of social cognition, and even less to
assume that such plateau should be the same for all individuals in
all historical contexts.
In line with at least part of the current literature (e.g., Apperly,
2012; Blakemore, 2012; Bosco et al., 2014b), our stance is that
the ontogeny of social cognition does not end with childhood;
instead, it continues through adolescence and the different
ages of adulthood, as biological, social, cultural, educational,
autobiographical, reflective, and retrospective changes accrue and
become ever more intertwined and stratified.
The whole issue is further complicated by the fact that
the psychological literature on adolescence in its turn offers
an overwhelmingly ample (and still growing), but fractured,
picture. This makes it difficult to achieve a deeper and coherent
understanding of it (Moshman, 2005).
In principle, and roughly stated, there can exist three possible
frameworks for understanding adolescence, namely as the exit
from childhood, the entrance into adulthood, or a distinct stage
of human life, a bridge between what comes before and after it but
(comparatively) autonomous with respect to both. While each of
these views has its merit, we argue that the second is preferable:
adolescence as the beginning of adulthood (in agreement with
Moshman, 2005).
Of course, this is not meant to imply that there can exist a
divide between childhood and adolescence/adulthood: instead,
the adoption of a life-course perspective promotes understanding
that the factors affecting the individual during childhood can
cumulatively affect her as an adolescent and an adult. At the
same time, both normative and maladaptive patterns during
adolescence shape future trajectories (Sawyer et al., 2012),
extending the development of (social) cognition to include issues
apparently unrelated like active aging, early determinants of health
and risk factors.
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Physical and mental health is affected by a complex interplay
of individual and social factors at personal, family, community,
and national levels (Viner et al., 2012), as well as by individual
differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., Romer et al., 2011),
attachment history (Bowlby, 1988), and personality traits. As we
are discussing throughout this paper, all these factors undergo
dramatic modifications during adolescence that tend to slow
down and stabilize as the individual becomes an adult—better yet,
that adultness begins when these factors begin to slow down and
stabilize. Given this framework, it is all too obvious that physical
andmental health “leaks” heavily from adolescence into adult life.
The onset of schizophrenia, for example, typically occurs
in late adolescence or early adulthood (Häfner and an der
Heiden, 1997; van Os and Kapur, 2009; WHO, 2015). Also, the
incidence of mood and anxiety-related dysfunctions increases
during adolescence (Hankin and Abramson, 2001; Costello et al.,
2002).
Adolescence, however, also presents risks and disorders of
its own. For example, during this age individuals are probably
the fastest, the strongest and the most resistant to disease that
they will ever be; at the same time, their chances of dying
from putting themselves at risk—through aggression, crime,
promiscuity, reckless driving, and drug use—also peak. It follows
that precisely such behaviors are the first cause of death in this age
group (Casey and Caudle, 2013).
Risk behaviors appear to be caused by diminished self-
control, sensation-seeking behaviors and peer pressure. Their
determinants are frequently searched in the brain development
and neuronal connections (e.g., Steinberg, 2008; Telzer et al.,
2013). Several authors have also found a peak in risk taking as
evaluated by laboratory tasks involving emotions (Figner et al.,
2009; Cauffman et al., 2010) and decision making (Wolf et al.,
2013).
A better understanding of adolescence and its features in terms
of social cognition would thus have profound implications for
protection and prevention. To relate scientific researches and
methodologies to real-life issues appears to be crucial in the study
of adolescence. Yet, a more critical analysis of the frequency and
the contexts of occurrence of risk-taking behaviors in adolescence
(Willoughby et al., 2013), an articulated model to understand the
evolutionary functions of adolescence (Ellis et al., 2012), and a
sound theoretical framework for social cognition during this age,
are still needed to complete the picture (and then to develop its
implications for protection and prevention).
What is Adolescence?
The rough definition of an adolescent as an individual who is no
longer a child but not yet a true adult might seem poor and fuzzy
from a scientific point of view, but it is probably the most effective
in capturing the complexity and contextual dependence of the
phenomenon called adolescence (e.g., Moshman, 2005; Hopkins,
2014).
In discussing adolescence, indeed, not only do we have to
consider the high variability between individuals, but we also have
to take into account that different societies define adolescence in
terms of ages and social roles with comparatively little consistency
(Sawyer et al., 2012). Furthermore, most societies throughout
human history have not acknowledged the existence of an age
called “adolescence,” at least as we understand it (e.g., Kett,
1977; Hine, 1999; Hopkins, 2014). Many of the 1.8 billion
youngstersmentioned above are likely not, or not fully, considered
adolescents within their social contexts.
The beginning of adolescence is commonly identified with
puberty, that is a complex biological transition which is universal
in the human species, although the age at which it occurs
may vary depending on features of both the individual and the
context.
The decrease in the age of puberty onset that has taken
place since the twentieth century in high-income countries
(Sawyer et al., 2012) demonstrates the role of contexts in shaping
individual trajectories, whereby the improvement in economic
and material conditions like childhood hygiene, nutrition, and
health appears to play a major role. At the same time, in
those countries, sociocultural conditions like a longer education,
possible delays or difficulties in employment, late marriage and
childbearing have extended the duration of adolescence and
changed its shape (Sawyer et al., 2012).
Adolescence looks different when viewed from one boundary
or the other: basically, its beginning depends on biological and
material features of the context, while its end depends on cultural
and social factors. This also entails that individual differences
become more important with age, while the merely chronological
data become less important.
Around and with puberty begins a multidimensional
and multilayered dynamics that involves every aspect of the
individual’s life. The young members of several cultures undergo
specific rites of passage that take puberty as the symbolic
threshold beyond which a child becomes an adult. Many cultures
set one or more later thresholds after which the individual will
be legally considered an adult as far as her rights and duties of
a political, juridical, military, work and otherwise formal nature
are concerned.
However, these further thresholds are merely relevant to legal
and social norms, so much so that Black’s (1990) law dictionary
defines adolescence as “the age which follows puberty and
precedes the age of majority.” Thus, an adult is anyone whom the
state legislation says is an adult, by modifying the permissions,
obligations and prohibitions that in different ways change her
social contexts and spheres of interaction as a member of the
community. However, there is no reason to think that these norms
depend on clear changes in the individual’s cognition, whether
social or otherwise.
A chronologically based definition promotes an understanding,
typical of Western societies, of adulthood as taking place within
the individual, with no concern for the social context: the end
of adolescence is determined by law, with exclusive reference to
age and not to the individual’s interaction with other people and
events (Schwartz et al., 2010).We opt for an operational definition
of adolescence, instead of a legal/chronological one. Of course,
this might turn out to be hardly manageable at the empirical level,
where researchers need to have well-defined groups of subjects
available; yet, we think that, at least on the theoretical level, this
is a more sensible approach.
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In fact, there may be different formal threshold ages for the
different facets of citizenship, and they may vary from nation
to nation or from decade to decade according to the historical
context.
In other words, there is no biological threshold after puberty
as well as no psychological threshold in a strict sense: the body,
including the brain, progressively changes until it slowly reaches a
mature stage, but it cannot be said to achieve a literally steady state,
nor a state which be clearly distinguishable from adolescence. Its
development never really ceases: it just slows down after the fast-
paced events ongoing during adolescence proper. The same, of
course, holds for cognition in general, and for social cognition
specifically.
This makes identifying an end to adolescence a particularly
difficult task. A phrase like coming to terms with adulthood
is vague enough to warrant widely (or even wildly) different
interpretations; and anyway, as we have said, adulthood may be
differently conceived of in historically different contexts or even
in different domains of an individual’s life. Thus, for example, in
many an affluent country it is comparatively normal to witness
a divergence between the age at which an individual is legally
and psychologically capable of living an autonomous adult’s life
and the individual or contextual conditions—like a particularly
prolonged education, or the prices of housing and living—that
may make this socially or subjectively unaffordable (Sawyer et al.,
2012). In other countries or in other socioeconomic situations, of
course, things may be hugely different: think, for example, of the
many areas, in affluent as well as in less protected environments,
where youngsters may legally or illegally be employed or exploited
as slave workers, prostitutes, soldiers, or even suicide bombers. In
this sense adolescence may be viewed as socially constructed by a
society that can and wants to afford it.
A definition of adolescence as coming to terms with adulthood
may appear to imply that mental life during this age should be
viewed as a precursor to that of full adulthood and thus exclusively
or prevailingly understood in terms of the latter: the adolescent
would then be nothing more than a “future adult.” This merits a
brief discussion.
There are indeed various ways in which a sort of teleology
belongs to this framework. At least some of the environments
in which the adolescent participates are explicitly or implicitly
conceived and structured so to offer the cognitive, social and
cultural tools that will help her to acquire the knowledge, the
competencies and the other skills that will be required of her as an
adult: schools, professional education, reformatories and military
academies are, of course, the most visible, important and formally
structured environments of this kind, but there may be others
as well. These environments in which the adolescent participates
require her to think and act like an adult: many such contexts
will be tolerant of “adolescent behavior,” but others will not, or
not completely. So far, we have a sort of a later-age, probably less
tolerant, equivalent of Vygotsky’s notion of the Zone of Proximal
Development (Vygotsky, 1978; Daniels et al., 2007).
On the other hand, it should be noted that the opposite process
may also be at work, whereby typically in the affluent areas of the
world adolescents are teenagers, that is a specific market segment
with features of its own. Of course, this also requires selling the
idea that adolescents are not adults, that they have a mental and
social functioning all of their own, and so on. The coexistence of
these two processes increases the complexity of the adolescent’s
mental and social life.
Furthermore, the adolescent represents herself at least partially
in accordance with the psychological, social, and cultural
coordinates in which she finds herself. For the first time, she
entertains a visible temporal and ontogenic horizon which she
may strive to achieve; that is, she represents her own future in
a non-oneiric way and may make concrete choices that are, or
at least aim to be, consequential. She thus oscillates between
two centers of gravity. One such center is the awareness and the
expectation that she is soon going to be an adult: she has an idea,
however approximate, of what this means, andmight work toward
such end, e.g., by going to school or by learning the skills that (she
thinks) will help her reach her goals as an adult. The other center
of gravity is the fears and the other emotions that prospective
adultness may ingenerate, and the desire to enjoy the space of
freedom which society allows her, in the fear of losing it with
passing years.
Thus, teleology in adolescence is different from what it could
be during childhood. While in both periods the individual needs
be considered in her present time, which she lives with the full
autonomy that her age allows for, adolescence is characterized by
internal as well as external pressures and tensions between such
present and a future which is both the object of representations,
expectations and positive and negative feelings, and a set of
cognitive, social and cultural tools that offer a scaffolding (again in
a Vygotskian sense) which the individual has available to govern
her own future, in a circularity whose features are those of a
partially self-fulfilling prophecy.
Summing up, adolescence begins with puberty and is
characterized by the intertwining of several kinds of changes:
(i) biological and psychological changes that are universal,
albeit occurring at different ages;
(ii) socio-cultural and psychological changes that are practically
universal, at least in their abstract or symbolical form, called
rites of passage;
(iii) socio-cultural and psychological changes that are local and
contextual, varying from the status of a young soldier, slave
or prostitute to that of a “teenager” in an affluent family;
(iv) the appearance of true autonomy and self-government, with
a still budding ability to deal with them and their internal
and external sources and consequences.
Adolescence has no precisely identifiable end; it slowly shifts
into adulthood as the individual comes to terms with his new
state. Coming to terms with adulthood may have many different
meanings, depending on the groups and the society in which an
individual finds himself, of the requests posed by his environment,
the resources and the opportunities he finds available, and so
on. While puberty is a necessary biological and psychological
transition, adulthood is defined contextually; in certain contexts
a reasonable level of adultness may be reached at different ages in
different domains, and often many years after biological maturity,
while in others a distorted adultness ends up to be superimposed
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on an individual who is not yet ready to cope with the ensuing set
of activities and interactions. Each of this paths may be laden with
problems and tensions, whichmay then relapse on the individual’s
psychological or social wellbeing.
What Adolescence Requires of Social
Cognition
From the subjective point of view, at least in Western countries,
adolescence is a time when an individual finds herself confronting
the feeling, simultaneously endogenous and exogenous, of
becoming an adult.When she has become reasonably able to come
to terms with these feelings, this phase ends; or, better, it shifts
seamlessly into “full adulthood.”
To conceive of adolescence as the beginning of adulthood
brings one to also view social cognition during this stage of life as
remarkably different from what it used to be during (the various
phases of) childhood and more akin to what it will be at later
ages. So, what developments in an individual’s social cognition
characterize this phase?
Changes in social cognition during adolescence are both inward
and outward. The latter may be summarized as a further opening
toward the world.
Several studies show how social networks change across the
life span. Interactions during infancy and childhood normally
take place within the family or in quasi-familiar environments
like primary school. The global social network grows during
adolescence, when the individual gains emotional and behavioral
autonomy from parents, and then tends to decrease throughout
adulthood (for a meta-analysis, see Wrzus et al., 2013).
An adolescent’s social network becomes wider but also more
impersonal in some of its zones. Adolescents are involved in
situations that require them to take a role in a strict sense,
including, e.g., secondary school, working places and other
social grounds characterized by formal and formally accountable
expectations and behaviors. The types of norms that this requires
them to handle are not, or not mainly, behavioral rules in the form
of do’s and don’ts like those that are learned during childhood;
instead, they are complex systems of social positioning and
reasoning that establish a certain worldview from which situated
social actions should be derived moment by moment. Things
are even more complicated, and more challenging for social
cognition, insofar as formality often is only part of the situation,
a sort of facade that belies complex informal interpersonal, social,
and (largely speaking) political dynamics.
On a still more abstract level, this new conception of social
worldviews, social grounds, and social roles typically expands to
system-wide dynamics. The adolescent begins to interact with
and within the society at large and its structures and institutions,
e.g., in terms of understanding and dealing with citizenship, or
of getting intellectually interested or materially involved in local,
national or international politics or economics. This is the age
when an individual may begin reading the news, taking a political
stance, participating in demonstrations or, in more troubled
contexts, more or less voluntarily carrying a weapon in a war.
Actually, possibly fueled by a still partial understanding of the
relevant dynamics and of their visible and hidden complexities,
the civic and political fervor of this period will seldom be
found again at later ages. Recent approaches to youth health
and development have taken a turn from the traditional view of
youths as victims or problems of society and passive recipients
of adult-directed interventions to one that portrays them as
powerful catalysts to community change by acting as resources
and competent citizens in their communities (Makhoul et al.,
2012).
We argue that these interests and activities fully engage social
cognition insofar as they require understanding social habits and
norms, the ways in which different individuals may follow, exploit
or violate such norms, the positions that different individuals
occupy in groups, organizations and the society at large, how they
have reached there and how they tend to interpret such position,
and so on.
Within areas more classically acknowledged as relevant to
social cognition proper there are at least two other crucial realms
that need be considered about social life in adolescence, namely
interaction with peers and interaction with romantic or sexual
partners. While neither of them appears, strictly speaking, in
adolescence, both take onwhole new nature and roles with respect
to what they used to be in childhood.
Peers may happen to be other individuals, different groups
of which the adolescent is or is not a member (including allied
or various rival or antagonistic groups), other organizations of
which she is or is not a member, and so on. In a different
acceptation of interaction, peers may even be the representations
of the peers that are projected by the various social and cultural
contexts in which the adolescent participates, like her family, her
friends, the media, or the society at large. Such projections may
be descriptive or normative in different ways, ranging from the
rules and expectations that are enforced by the family or the group
of peers to narratives found in books and movies, marketing and
advertising in the media, and so on.
Interactions with peers, like all interactions, require the
adolescent to handle habits and norms, hierarchies and statuses,
and to understand how arrays of other individuals do the
same. At the same time, however, these interactions may be
“hotter” than others to adolescents: they are less abstract, more
situated, and more emotionally and intellectually compelling.
Therefore, these immediate social dynamics cannot be handled
with the tendentially formal rules with which the more removed
ones discussed above are: dealing with peers thus tends to
be subjectively more complex, more challenging, and more
potentially awkward.
At least in several human societies, even more so may be the
other crucial type of interaction that characterizes adolescence,
namely the romantic and/or sexual, which may (at least in
principle) address the individual toward the construction of a
long-lasting relationship. This poses several problems. Courting
someone, or letting someone court us, requires a complicated
game of showing and concealing one’s feelings and intentions.
Even more importantly, it requires recognizing, labeling, and
wording one’s own feelings and emotions (like, “what is it that I
feel? Is this what love is? or is it sexual desire?” and so on) as well as
those of the partner’s. All of this turmoil may often involve further
persons on one or the other side of the actual or potential couple,
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giving rise to even more complicated problems about cheating,
jealousy, rejection, and so on.
Even such a brief outline of the changes that characterize
outward social life and social cognition during adolescencemakes
it clear why an analogously complex change in inward, that is
reflective, social cognition is needed. Basically, the adolescent has
to devise cognitive tools andways to deal, on the one hand, with all
that is happening in the highly complex, multidimensional space
of her outbound social life and, on the other hand, with her own
rapidly changing personal identity.
This requires her, among other things, to be able to monitor,
understand, explain, predict, abstract from, and, first and
foremost, feel, her ownmental dynamics: the kind of questions she
has to answer may take forms like “what is this that I feel? whence
do these thoughts and emotions come? how do I explain them?
where do they leadme? how do I judge them? are they good or are
they bad? how do I control them? how do I share them with other
individuals, and how should I choose these individuals?”.
Internal tensions concerning this dynamics may easily ensue,
due to the sheer difficulty of dealing with such complex questions,
accepting their consequences for oneself and for various other
persons, and accepting the continuous redefinition of personal
identity that they propose. It is in this age that social dynamics as
diverse as shame, pride, isolation, rage, rebellion, leadership and
others thrive: in several senses, this is the end of innocence. It also
comes as no surprise that adolescents are more at risk of deviant
behavior as well as of becoming victims of hoaxes, deceits, and so
on.
Summing up, an individual’s social cognition during
adolescence is asked to deal in increasingly complex ways
with (and, circularly, her social cognition begins to provide her
with the ability of dealing with) different types of contexts:
(i) her own mind;
(ii) other, specific individuals (family, friends, colleagues or
classmates, romantic or sexual partners, and so on);
(iii) other, generic individuals (strangers);
(iv) groups and organizations and their individual members
acting as such.
This requires an intertwining of social cognition with other
“cognitive functions” like planning and organizing one’s own
actions and recognizing how others plan and organize theirs,
processes of education, cultivation, and acculturation, an
appropriate management of autobiographical memory, and so on.
Data From Developmental Psychology
ToM is generally considered a crucial part of social cognition and
has been extensively studied in developmental psychology.
Children’s ability to understand and reason about mental states
has traditionally been investigated by testing their accuracy on
mentalizing tasks, often based on false beliefs (Dennett, 1978),
which are typically passed by 3- or 4-years-olds (Wimmer and
Perner, 1983; Wellman and Liu, 2004). As discussed above, these
kinds of tests rapidly reach a ceiling effect as the subjects’ age
increases; a gap thus emerges in the literature after the pre-scholar
period. Researches with children older than about four have
used more complex ToM tasks (e.g., Happé, 1994; Baron-Cohen
et al., 1999); however, precisely these methodological differences
make it difficult to highlight continuities or discontinuities in
development (Apperly et al., 2011).
In any case, it is hard to imagine that social cognition would not
change with adolescence, if only because the individual’s general
cognitive abilities change, as well as her social experiences do
(Blakemore and Choudhury, 2006). In comparison with the large
amount of researches investigating mentalizing abilities during
childhood, however, only few studies explored the development
of these capacities in adolescence and their relations with other
life-span developments (Colvert et al., 2008; Apperly et al., 2011;
Harenski et al., 2012).
The ability to reason about themental states of the others and to
understand and take into consideration what they think, feel and
believe appears to require the ability to take another individual’s
perspective, which in turn is crucial to successfully manage social
communication. Perspective taking is related to first-order ToM,
since it involves what another person is thinking; also, it requires
the awareness of one’s ownmental states (first-person perspective)
and the ability to ascribe mental states to other individuals (third-
person perspective; Blakemore and Choudhury, 2006).
In a study by Choudhury et al. (2006), children, adolescents
and adults were tested with a perspective-taking task requiring
them to imagine which emotion they themselves (first-person
perspective) or another person (third-person perspective) would
feel in different scenarios. The results showed that the differences
in reaction time between first- and third-person perspective-
taking decreased with age, suggesting that proficiency at
perspective-taking improves between childhood and adulthood.
Dumontheil et al. (2010) tested the ability of a large sample
of children, adolescents and young adults (aged 7–27) to use
information received about another person’s point of view in a
perspective-taking communicative task. Again, the ability to take
another person’s perspective into account turned out to grow
from infancy through adolescence with further improvements in
adulthood.
Fett et al. (2014) showed that a greater inclination to take the
others’ perspectives into account was associated with a stronger
pro-social approach toward others and a stronger trust during
cooperative interactions. In interactions with an unfair partner,
this inclination was associated with a more drastic decrease of
trust and less benevolent reciprocity.
Bosco et al. (2014b) assessed the ability to understand and
manage mental states in pre-adolescence and adolescence using
the ToM Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.: Bosco et al., 2009a; see
also Laghi et al., 2014) and some well-known ToM tasks (namely a
subset of the Strange Stories byHappé, 1994). Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-
structured interview organized along four scales, each focusing
on one of the knowledge domains in which a person’s ToM may
manifest itself; it provides a detailed profile of different facets
of ToM abilities, namely first- vs. second-order, first- vs. third-
person, egocentric vs. allocentric perspective. It also explores
different types of mental states involved in ToM, namely beliefs,
desires, positive emotions, and negative emotions. The results
were that the performance at Th.o.m.a.s. improves with age,
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confirming that the ontogeny of ToM continues at least through
adolescence.
Furthermore, in agreement with Goldman’s (1993) hypothesis
that adolescents can better reason about their own mental states
than about those of the others, the participants performed
better at first-person than at third-person tasks. This appears
consistent with the widely diffused perception that a typical
feature of preadolescence and adolescence is a tighter focus on
the attempt to understand oneself than the others. Also, again in
agreement with previous literature (Wellman and Liu, 2004), the
adolescents performed better at first-order than at second-order
ToM tasks. No significant difference emerged, instead, between
the allocentric and the egocentric viewpoint.
The performance at Strange Stories did not reveal any
significant age-related difference; however, there is no evidence in
the literature that there should be any. While Strange Stories are
considered advanced ToM tasks, they were originally developed
for children (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Happé, 1994) and thus they too
are probably unfit for the study of mentalization at later ages.
Th.o.m.a.s. also investigates the ability to deal with different
types of mental states (beliefs, desires, positive emotions, negative
emotions). In Bosco et al. (2014b), the participants scored higher
at negative emotions than at the others, a result that could be
explained with the turbulent psychological and relational changes
that characterize adolescence, together with a sort of existential
confusion which is likely to lead a person to reflect more deeply
on her own negative emotions.
The ability tomake inferences about emotions is called affective
ToM and may be conceptualized as the integration of cognitive
ToM (inferences about knowledge and beliefs) and empathy
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). In a study by Sebastian et al.
(2011), adolescents made more errors than adults in choosing the
appropriate ending of vignettes depicting a character’s response
to a companion’s emotions. Vetter et al. (2013) used film clips
depicting the manifestation of emotions to investigate affective
ToM across adolescence, finding that it develops with age. They
also found that it correlates with executive functions (specifically
inhibition) throughout adolescence until young adulthood.
The phrase executive functions refers to the cognitive processes
involved in goal-directed actions, such as those that allow
an individual to control and coordinate his thoughts and
behavior (Shallice, 1982). These are, for example, selective
attention, working memory, decision-making, and inhibition.
Several behavioral studies show that the ability to manage tasks
like inhibitory control (Leon-Carrion et al., 2004), processing
speed (Luna et al., 2004), working memory and decision-making
(Hooper et al., 2004) continues to develop during adolescence.
A correlation between affective ToM and inhibition has also
been found in studies conducted with young adults (Bull et al.,
2008; Ahmed and Miller, 2011). In pre-school children, executive
functions have been shown to play an important role in ToM
performance (Carlson andMoses, 2001), which suggests that they
may play an important role in the subsequent developmental
stages as well.
Another construct which is commonly held to be closely related
to social cognition is metacognition, defined as the ability to
think about thinking (Flavell, 1979). Semerari et al. (2003, 2007)
view it as composed of an array of independent subfunctions that
concur to its overall functioning, namely the abilities to recognize
one’s own thoughts and emotions, to relate them to the relevant
interpersonal events, to understand the mental states of other
persons and to keep them distinct from (and possibly different to)
those of one’s own, to acknowledge that mental states incorporate
a point of view and therefore are fallible, to describe mental states
modifications in a coherent narrative, and to control and adjust
internal states (mastery: more about this later). Based on this
theoretical elaboration, Semerari et al. (2012) built and validated
a semi-structured interview called the Metacognition Assessment
Interview (MAI), that has been administered to persons with
schizophrenia or personality disorders. What is relevant to our
current purposes is the notions that social cognition is a highly
complex faculty, far from being reducible to simpler processes,
even if complex in their own way like ToM, and that there can
be individual or ontogenetic differences in the persons’ capacity
to handle it.
Metacognitive mastery has been correlated with quality of life
(Lysaker et al., 2005) and the complexity of social functioning
(Lysaker et al., 2010) in persons with schizophrenia. In general,
metacognition appears to be able to influence several aspects
of experience (Metcalfe, 1996) such as self-regulating learning
(Efklides, 2009) and decision making (Weil et al., 2013). An
impairment in the ability to reflect on and to use knowledge
about the mental states of one’s own and those of the others
may hamper the ability to cope with complex psychological and
relational challenges and thus lead to dysfunctional reactions to
individual or interactional difficulties (Lysaker et al., 2010). Given
the dramatic number of new experiences and transformations
characterizing adolescence, these issues and their interplay may
end up playing a significant role.
Demetriou and Bakracevic (2009) investigated metacognitive
ability asking adolescents and adults to assess their own
performance on propositional, spatial and social reasoning tasks;
this self-evaluation was found to improve from adolescence to
adulthood.
Weil et al. (2013) analyzed the development of metacognitive
ability from adolescence to adulthood, during a visual task
implying decision-making processes. Their results showed that
the awareness of one’s own perceptual decisions undergoes a
prolonged developmental trajectory during adolescence, again
suggesting that metacognitive ability significantly improves with
age.
Somatic Changes and Brain Maturation
Adolescence brings with itself a vast array of bodilymodifications.
Some of these modifications, namely those in the brain, are not
immediately available to the subject’s awareness, while others are
external and dramatically important from a subjective point of
view.
Adolescence, for example, normally entails a sudden, rapid, and
remarkable upgrowth. One finds herself watching the world from
about the same level from which adults watch it, sometimes from
an even higher one. This alone will obviously yield a difference
in how one perceives social relations, hierarchies and statuses,
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power (whether social or crudely physical), dependability, and so
on. Perspective taking here is laden with an experiential burden
that makes it impossible to reduce it to a “cognitive” issue in the
classic acceptation of such word. The growth of muscle mass and
the increase in agility and physical strength add to this change of
one’s body image.
Even more the same holds for sex-related morphological
changes, like the development of primary and secondary sex
characteristics. To find oneself being the agent or the recipient of
sexual attention, sexual desire and sex-related activities, as well as
not being one despite one’s desires or needs, has an obvious impact
on one’s social attitudes. To acquire and to come to terms with the
relevant set of thoughts, feelings, emotions, habits and so on, both
in oneself and in the others, is a seemingly impossible task that,
nevertheless, needs be accomplished with reasonable speed and
efficiency.
A completely different set of data and considerations is supplied
by other, more classic areas of research.
Several authors suggest that the endocrine changes that
characterize puberty influence brain development and
restructuring during adolescence (Sowell et al., 2002; Lenroot
et al., 2007; for reviews, see Peper et al., 2011; Peper and Dahl,
2013). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies
provide evidence of the plasticity of the adolescent’s brain,
characterized by a general structural development, a synaptic
neuronal reorganization and increase in connectivity (Sowell
et al., 2003). Social cognition, particularly the ability to mentalize,
is associated with a network of brain regions commonly referred
to as the “social brain” (Frith and Frith, 2003). This network
appears to be the counterpart of the ability to recognize other
persons’ mental states like intentions, feelings, emotions, desires
and beliefs, and to use such recognition to understand their
behavior. The social brain includes several areas: the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
the inferior frontal gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the
amygdala and the anterior insula (Blakemore, 2008).
Several studies offer empirical evidence of the development
of the social brain during the adolescence (for a review, see
Blakemore, 2008). Recently this subject has received renewed
interest. Mills et al. (2014) studied the structural development
of the social brain from late childhood through adolescence and
into adulthood. They found that gray matter volume and cortical
thickness in the mPFC, the temporoparietal junction and the
posterior STS decreased from childhood into the early twenties.
The anterior temporal cortex increased in gray matter volume
until adolescence and in cortical thickness until early adulthood.
The surface area for each region peaks in pre-adolescence or
early adolescence before decreasing into the early twenties. The
authors suggested that the reductions in gray matter volume may
reflect synaptic reorganization and concluded that the social brain
network continues to develop structurally across adolescence
before relatively stabilizing in the early twenties.
Klapwijk et al. (2013) analyzed the relations of a set of endocrine
and somatic pubertal indicators with functional connectivity in
the social brain (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, right posterior
STS and right temporoparietal junction) involved in emotion
processing in girls aged 11–13 years. Their results suggest that the
progress of puberty in girls is related to the functional maturation
of the social brain.
Finally, Goddings et al. (2014) found that puberty has a
important role in influencing the subcortical development of
the brain. They analyzed data from longitudinal magnetic
resonance imaging scans of individuals aged 7–20 years, finding
an interactive puberty-by-age effect on the volume of the
nucleus accumbens, the globus pallidus and the caudate: these
regions are involved in reward-seeking behaviors and decision-
making processes (Gottfried, 2011). Goddings et al. (2014) also
found pubertal effects on the growth of the amygdala, which
is involved in emotion processing. Pubertal changes include
modifications in the neurobiology of stress and emotions, capable
of shaping reactivity to stressors and affective stimuli (Spear,
2009). These modifications may precipitate the emergence of
psychopathologies in vulnerable individuals and contribute to the
emergence of psychological disorders (Dahl, 2004; Walker et al.,
2004).
Globally considered, these modifications appear to be related
to several aspects of mind functioning that characterize social
cognitive ability (see also Moriguchi et al., 2007). It probably
is no coincidence that many of the functions whose cerebral
counterparts undergo such modifications are those in which
adolescence looks more stormy and potentially unsafe. Yet, brain
studies can hardly link brain modifications to a person’s social
and cultural experience. In this sense, the “social brain” should
be viewed and studied as a feature not of the individual, but
of the contexts in which the embedded, situated, and embodied
individual participates.
Conclusion
Adolescence is an extremely interesting as well as challenging
topic for the study of social cognition.
A first issue is that context-free studies can hardly be devised.
The social, cultural, educational, economic, and autobiographical
situations in which the individuals participate play too important
a role in how they experience and enact their social life. For
the same reason, it is likely impossible to devise empirical
methodologies similar to those that are commonly employed in
the study of other aspects of the functioning of the mind or of
the social life in infancy and childhood. Not coincidentally, a
comparatively advanced ToM task like the Strange Stories (Happé,
1994), differently to the false-belief tasks that are used with
children, is built around a narrative infrastructure and its contents
are culturally localized.
A second issue is that the empirical methodologies should
be adjusted to keep into account the vast differences in social
situations, cognition, and actions that exist between different
contexts, between different individuals, and between the different
domains and activities in which the same individual may
participate.
A third issue is that the notions that are generally employed for
the study of social cognition, like ToM, are probably insufficient
to account for it. In a phenomenological approach such as
that adopted, for example, by Gallagher (2006), the notion of
a ratiomorphic, purely inferential ToM appears to be far too
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simplistic to account for the richness and the complexity of human
social experience. The alternative proposed by Gallagher is in
terms of a narrative competence, which in its turn would be
grounded in the direct perceptual access to the intentions and the
feelings of others: in this approach, second-person interactions
would replace the more typically studied observations in the
third-person; and, of course, the situated, embedded, embodied,
autobiographically rich first person would be the center of gravity
of the whole narrative.
Theory of mind would then intervene when a breakdown
occurs, analogously to how theories in naïve (or non-naïve)
physics intervenewhenour bodily experience, normally grounded
in habits and choreographies, encounters a breakdown.
Thus, according to Gallagher and Hutto (2008), it is not the
inner life or the mental life of the others that we attempt to
access, but their life in its worldly contexts, which is best captured
in a narrative form. Life events, including social interactions,
happen as stories with a beginning, a development, and possibly
an end, that take place in the world and in which we, and
the others, may happen to play a part (see also Goffman,
1959).
Adolescence may then be viewed as an age in which the
narratives change suddenly and profoundly, opening a world of
new possibilities, new promises, new dangers. Cast abruptly in
this new world, the adolescent has to wade through it, finding her
own way to deal with the new situations in which she wants and
needs to find herself. In this task, social life is simultaneously a
huge source of problems, opportunities, and resources. That most
of us survive this storm to find comparatively calmer waters is one
of the most amazing feat of human kind.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by Cassa di Risparmio di Torino
(CRT) Foundation, Vivomeglio, 2013. Project: Rehabilitation of
communicative deficit in patients with schizophrenia.
References
Ahmed, F. S., and Miller, L. S. (2011). Executive function mechanisms of theory of
mind. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 41, 667–678. doi: 10.1007/s10803-010-1087-7
Apperly, I. A. (2012). What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive
processes and individual differences. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 65, 825–839. doi:
10.1080/17470218.2012.676055
Apperly, I. A. (2013). “Can theory of mind grow up? Mindreading in adults,
and its implications for the development and neuroscience of mindreading,”
in Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social
Neuroscience, eds S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and M. Lombardo
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 72–92.
Apperly, I. A., Warren, F., Andrews, B. J., Grant, J., and Todd, S. (2011).
Developmental continuity in theory of mind: speed and accuracy of
belief–desire reasoning in children and adults. Child Dev. 82, 1691–1703.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01635.x
Bara, B. G., and Tirassa, M. (2010). A mentalist framework for linguistic and
extralinguistic communication. Linguist. Philos. Investig. 9, 182–193.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1989). The autistic child’s Theory of Mind: a case of
specific developmental delay. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 30, 285–297. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-7610.1989.tb00241.x
Baron-Cohen, S., O’Riordan, M., Stone, V., Jones, R., and Plaistead, K. (1999).
Recognition of faux pas by normally developing children and children with
Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 29,
407–418. doi: 10.1023/A:1023035012436
Black, H. C. (1990). Black’s Law Dictionary. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.
Blakemore, S. J. (2008). The social brain in adolescence. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9,
267–277. doi: 10.1038/nrn2353
Blakemore, S. J. (2012). Imaging brain development: the adolescent brain.
Neuroimage 61, 397–406. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.11.080
Blakemore, S. J., and Choudhury, S. (2006). Development of the adolescent brain:
implications for executive function and social cognition. J. Child Psychol.
Psychiatry 47, 296–312. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.2006.01611.x
Blakemore, S. J., den Ouden, H., Choudhury, S., and Frith, C. (2007). Adolescent
development of the neural circuitry for thinking about intentions. Soc. Cogn.
Affect. Neurosci. 2, 130–139. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsm009
Bosco, F. M., Capozzi, F., Colle, L., Marostica, P., and Tirassa, M. (2014a).
Theory of Mind deficit in subjects with alcohol use disorder: an analysis
of mindreading processes. Alcohol Alcohol. 49, 299–307. doi: 10.1093/alcalc/
agt148
Bosco, F. M., Gabbatore, I., and Tirassa, M. (2014b). A broad assessment of theory
of mind in adolescence: the complexity of mindreading. Conscious. Cogn. 24,
84–97. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.003
Bosco, F. M., Colle, L., De Fazio, A., Bono, S., Ruberti, S., and Tirassa, M. (2009a).
Th.o.m.a.s.: an exploratory assessment of Theory of Mind in schizophrenic
subjects. Conscious. Cogn. 18, 306–319. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.
06.006
Bosco, F. M., Colle, L., and Tirassa, M. (2009b). The complexity of Theory of Mind.
Conscious. Cogn. 18, 323–324. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.12.007
Bowlby, J. (1988). A Secure Base: Parent-Child Attachment and Healthy Human
Development. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Bull, R., Phillips, L. H., and Conway, C. A. (2008). The role of control functions
in mentalizing: dual-task studies of theory of mind and executive function.
Cognition 107, 663–672. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.015
Burnett, S., Bird, G., Moll, J., Frith, C., and Blakemore, S. J. (2009). Development
during adolescence of the neural processing of social emotion. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
21, 1736–1750. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21121
Byrne, R. W., and Whiten, A. (eds). (1985). Machiavellian Intelligence: Social
Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Carlson, S. M., and Moses, L. J. (2001). Individual differences in inhibitory control
and children’s theory of mind. Child Dev. 72, 1032–1053. doi: 10.1111/1467-
8624.00333
Carpenter, M., Nagell, K., Tomasello, M., Butterworth, G., and Moore, C. (1998).
Social cognition, joint attention, and communicative competence from 9 to
15 months of age. Monogr. Soc. Res. Child Dev. 63, 1–143. doi: 10.2307/116
6214
Casey, B. J., and Caudle, K. (2013). The teenage brain self control. Curr. Dir. Psychol.
Sci. 22, 82–87. doi: 10.1177/0963721413480170
Cauffman, E., Shulman, E. P., Steinberg, L., Claus, E., Banich, M. T., Graham,
S., et al. (2010). Age differences in affective decision making as indexed by
performance on the Iowa Gambling Task. Dev. Psychol. 46, 193–207. doi:
10.1037/a0016128
Choudhury, S., Blakemore, S.-J., and Charman, T. (2006). Social cognitive
development during adolescence. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 1, 165–174. doi:
10.1093/scan/nsl024
Clancey, W. J. (1997). “The conceptual nature of knowledge, situations,
and activity,” in Human and Machine Expertise in Context, eds P.
Feltovich, R. Hoffmann, and K. Ford (Menlo Park, CA: The AAAI Press),
247–291.
Colvert, E., Rutter, M., Kreppner, J., Beckett, C., Castle, J., Groothues, C., et al.
(2008). Do theory of mind and executive function deficits underlie the adverse
outcomes associatedwith profound early deprivation? Findings from the English
and Romanian adoptees study. J. Abnorm. Child Psychol. 36, 1057–1068. doi:
10.1007/s10802-008-9232-x
Costello, E. J., Pine, D. S., Hammen, C., March, J. S., Plotsky, P. M., Weissman,
M. M., et al. (2002). Development and natural history of mood disorders. Biol.
Psychiatry 52, 529–542. doi: 10.1016/S0006-3223(02)01372-0
Crone, E. A. (2013). Considerations of fairness in the adolescent brain. Child Dev.
Perspect. 7, 97–103. doi: 10.1111/cdep.12022
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 101110
Brizio et al. Social cognition in adolescence
Dahl, R. E. (2004). Adolescent brain development: a period of vulnerabilities
and opportunities. Keynote address. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1021, 1–22. doi:
10.1196/annals.1308.001
Daniels, H., Cole, M., and Wertsch, J. V. (eds). (2007). The Cambridge Companion
to Vygotsky. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Davies, M., and Stone, T. (1995). Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate.
Chichester: Wiley.
Demetriou, A., and Bakracevic, K. (2009). Reasoning and self-awareness from
adolescence to middle age: organization and development as a function of
education. Learn. Indiv. Dif. 19, 181–194. doi: 10.1016/j.lindif.2008.10.007
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behav. Brain Sci. 1, 568–570. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X00076664
Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I. A., and Blakemore, S.-J. (2010). Online usage of theory
of mind continues to develop in late adolescence. Dev. Sci. 13, 331–338. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00888.x
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1993). Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and
language in humans. Behav. Brain Sci. 16, 681–735. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X000
32325
Efklides, A. (2009). The role of metacognitive experiences in the learning process.
Psicothema 21, 76–82.
Ellis, B. J., Del Giudice, M., Dishion, T. J., Figueredo, A. J., Gray, P., Griskevicius, V.,
et al. (2012). The evolutionary basis of risky adolescent behavior: implications for
science, policy, and practice. Dev. Psychol. 48, 598–623. doi: 10.1037/a0026220
Farroni, T., Johnson, M. H., Menon, E., Zulian, L., Faraguna, D., and Csibra,
G. (2005). Newborns’ preference for face-relevant stimuli: effects of
contrast polarity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 102, 17245–17250. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0502205102
Fett, A. K. J., Shergill, S. S., Gromann, P. M., Dumontheil, I., Blakemore,
S.-J., Yakub, F., et al. (2014). Trust and social reciprocity in
adolescence—a matter of perspective-taking. J. Adolesc. 37, 175–184. doi:
10.1016/j.adolescence.2013.11.011
Figner, B., Mackinlay, R. J., Wilkening, F. E., and Weber, U. (2009). Affective
and deliberative processes in risky choice: age differences in risk taking in the
Columbia Card Task. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 35, 709–730. doi:
10.1037/a0014983
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: a new area of
cognitive-developmental inquiry. Am. Psychol. 34, 906–911. doi: 10.1037/0003-
066X.34.10.906
Frith, C. D. (1992). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Frith, C. D. (2008). Social cognition. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 363,
2033–2039. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0005
Frith, U., and Frith, C. D. (2003). Development and neurophysiology ofmentalizing.
Philos. Trans. Biol. Sci. 358, 459–473. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2002.1218
Gallagher, S. (2006). “The narrative alternative to theory of mind,” in Radical
Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative, ed. R. Menary
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins), 223–229.
Gallagher, S., and Hutto, D. (2008). “Understanding others through primary
interaction and narrative practice,” in The Shared Mind: Perspectives on
Intersubjectivity, eds J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha, and E. Itkonen (Amsterdam:
John Benjamins), 17–38.
Goddings, A.,Mills, K. L., Clasenc, L., Giedd, J. N., Viner, R.M., and Blakemore, S.-J.
(2014). The influence of puberty on subcortical brain development.Neuroimage
88, 242–251. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.09.073
Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York, NY:
Doubleday.
Goldman, A. I. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. Behav. Brain Sci. 16,
15–28. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00028648
Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and
Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gottfried, J. A. (2011). Neurobiology of Sensation and Reward (Frontiers in
Neuroscience). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Häfner, H., and an der Heiden, W. (1997). Epidemiology of schizophrenia. Can. J.
Psychiatry 42, 139–151.
Hankin, B. L., and Abramson, L. Y. (2001). Development of gender differences
in depression: an elaborated cognitive vulnerability–transactional stress theory.
Psychol. Bull. 127, 773–796. doi: 10.1O37//O033-29O9.127.6.773
Happé, F. (1994). An advanced test of theory of mind: understanding of story
characters’ thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped,
and normal children and adults. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 24, 129–154. doi:
10.1007/BF02172093
Harenski, C. L., Harenski, K. A., Shane, M. S., and Kiehl, K. A. (2012).
Neural development of mentalizing in moral judgment from adolescence
to adulthood. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 2, 162–173. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2011.
09.002
Henry, J. D., Phillips, L. H., Ruffman, T., and Bailey, P. E. (2013). A meta-analytic
review of age differences in theory of mind. Psychol. Aging 28, 826–839. doi:
10.1037/a0030677
Heyes, C. M. (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behav. Brain Sci. 21,
101–148. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X98000703
Hine, T. (1999). The rise and decline of the teenager. Am. Herit. 50, 71–8l.
Hooper, C. J., Luciana, M., Conklin, H. M., and Yarger, R. S. (2004).
Adolescents’ performance on the development of decision making
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Dev. Psychol. 40, 1148–1158. doi:
10.1037/0012-1649.40.6.1148
Hopkins, J. R. (2014). Adolescence: The Transitional Years. New York: Academic
Press.
Humphrey, N. K. (1976). “The social function of intellect,” in Growing Points
in Ethology, eds P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 303–317.
Hutto, D. D., Herschbach, M., and Southgate, V. (2011). Social cognition:
mindreading and alternatives (Editorial). Rev. Philos. Psychol. 2, 375–395. doi:
10.1007/s13164-011-0073-0
Kett, J. F. (1977). Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1790–Present. New York,
NY: Basic Books.
Klapwijk, E. T., Goddings, A. L., Heyes, S. B., Bird, G., Viner, R. M., and Blakemore,
S.-J. (2013). Increased functional connectivity with puberty in the mentalising
network involved in social emotion processing. Horm. Behav. 64, 314–322. doi:
10.1016/j.yhbeh.2013.03.012
Laghi, F., Cotugno, A., Cecere, F., Sirolli, A., Palazzoni, D., and Bosco, F.
M. (2014). An exploratory assessment of theory of mind and psychological
impairment in patients with bulimia nervosa. Br. J. Psychol. 105, 509–523. doi:
10.1111/bjop.12054
Lenroot, R. K., Gogtay, N., Greenstein, D. K., Wells, E. M., Wallace, G. L.,
Clasen, L. S., et al. (2007). Sexual dimorphism of brain developmental
trajectories during childhood and adolescence. Neuroimage 36, 1065–1073. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.03.053
Leon-Carrion, J., Garcia-Orza, J., and Perez-Santamaria, F. J. (2004). The
development of the inhibitory component of the executive functions
in children and adolescents. Int. J. Neurosci. 114, 1291–1311. doi:
10.1080/00207450490476066
Luna, B., Garver, K. E., Urban, T. A., Lazar, N. A., and Sweeney, J. A. (2004).
Maturation of cognitive processes from late childhood to adulthood. Child Dev.
75, 1357–1372. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00745.x
Lysaker, P. H., Carcione, A., Dimaggio, G., Johannesen, J. K., Nicolò, G.,
Procacci, M., et al. (2005). Metacognition amidst narratives of self and illness
in schizophrenia: associations with neurocognition, symptoms, insight and
quality of life. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 112, 64–71. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0447.2005.
00514.x
Lysaker, P. H., Dimaggio, G., Carcione, A., Procacci, M., Buck, K. D., Davis, L. W.,
et al. (2010). Metacognition and schizophrenia: the capacity for self-reflectivity
as a predictor for prospective assessments of work performance over six months.
Schizophr. Res. 122, 124–130. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2009.04.024
Makhoul, J., Alameddine, M., and Afifi, R. A. (2012). ‘I felt that I was benefiting
someone’: youth as agents of change in a refugee community project. Health
Educ. Res. 27, 914–926. doi: 10.1093/her/cyr011
Metcalfe, J. (1996). Metacognition: Knowing about knowing. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Mills, K. L., Goddings, A.-L., and Blakemore, S.-J. (2014). Drama in the teenage
brain. Front. Young Minds 2:16. doi: 10.3389/frym.2014.00016
Moran, J. M. (2013). Lifespan development: the effects of typical aging on theory of
mind. Behav. Brain Res. 237, 32–40. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2012.09.020
Moriguchi, Y., Ohnishi, T., Mori, T., Matsuda, H., and Komaki, G. (2007). Changes
of brain activity in the neural substrates for theory of mind during childhood
and adolescence. Psychiatry Clin. Neurosci. 61, 355–363. doi: 10.1111/j.1440-
1819.2007.01687.x
Moshman, D. (2005). Adolescent Psychological Development: Rationality, Morality,
and Identity, ed. Lawrence Erlbaum (Mahwah, NJ: Psychology Press.)
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 101111
Brizio et al. Social cognition in adolescence
Nichols, S., and Stich, S. P. (2003).Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Presence,
Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Pelphrey, K. A., and Carter, E. J. (2008). Brain mechanisms for social perception.
Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1145, 283–299. doi: 10.1196/annals.1416.007
Peper, J. S., and Dahl, R. E. (2013). Teenage brain: surging hormones—Brain-
behavior interactions during puberty. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 22, 134–139. doi:
10.1177/0963721412473755
Peper, J. S., Hulshoff Pol, H. E., Crone, E. A., and van Honk, J. (2011). Sex steroids
and brain structure in pubertal boys and girls: a mini-review of neuroimaging
studies. Neuroscience 191, 28–37. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroscience.2011.
02.014
Premack, D., and Premack, A. J. (1994). “Why animals have neither culture nor
history,” in Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology, ed. T. Ingold (London:
Routledge), 350–365.
Romer, D., Betancourt, L. M., Brodsky, N. L., Giannetta, J. M., Yang, W., and
Hurt, H. (2011). Does adolescent risk taking imply weak executive function?
A prospective study of relations between working memory performance,
impulsivity, and risk taking in early adolescence. Dev. Sci. 14, 1119–1133. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01061.x
Sawyer, S. M., Afifi, R. A., Bearinger, L. H., Blakemore, S. J., Dick, B., Ezeh, A. C., et
al. (2012). Adolescence: a foundation for future health. Lancet 379, 1630–1640.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60072-5
Schwartz, S. J., Unger, J. B., Zamboanga, B. L., and Szapocznik, J. (2010). Rethinking
the concept of acculturation: implications for theory and research. Am. Psychol.
65, 237–251. doi: 10.1037/a0019330
Sebastian, C. L., Fontaine, N.M., Bird, G., Blakemore, S.-J., De Brito, S. A.,McCrory,
E. J., et al. (2011). Neural processing associated with cognitive and affective
Theory of Mind in adolescents and adults. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7, 53–63.
doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr023
Semerari, A., Carcione, A., Dimaggio, G., Falcone, M., Nicolo, G., Procacci, M., et
al. (2003). How to evaluate metacognitive functioning in psychotherapy? The
Metacognition Assessment Scale and its applications. Clin. Psychol. Psychother.
10, 238–261. doi: 10.1002/cpp.362
Semerari, A., Carcione, A., Dimaggio, G., Nicolò, G., and Procacci, M. (2007).
Understanding minds: different functions and different disorders? The
contribution of psychotherapy research. Psychother. Res. 17, 106–119. doi:
10.1080/10503300500536953
Semerari, A., Cucchi, M., Dimaggio, G., Cavadini, D., Carcione, A., Battelli,
V., et al. (2012). The development of the Metacognition Assessment
Interview: instrument description, factor structure and reliability in a non-
clinical sample. Psychiatry Res. 200, 890–895. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2012.
07.015
Shallice, T. (1982). Specific impairments of planning. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B
Biol. Sci. 298, 199–209. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1982.0082
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Harari, H., Aharon-Peretz, J., and Levkovitz, Y. (2010).
The role of the orbitofrontal cortex in affective theory of mind deficits in
criminal offenders with psychopathic tendencies. Cortex 46, 668–77. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2009.04.008
Sowell, E. R., Peterson, B. S., Thompson, P. M., Welcome, S. E., Henkenius, A. L.,
and Toga, A. W. (2003). Mapping cortical change across the human life span.
Nat. Neurosci. 6, 309–315. doi: 10.1038/nn1008
Sowell, E. R., Trauner, D. A., Gamst, A., and Jernigan, T. L. (2002). Development
of cortical and subcortical brain structures in childhood and adolescence: a
structural MRI study. Dev. Med. Child Neurol. 44, 4–16. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
8749.2002.tb00253.x
Spear, L. P. (2009). Heightened stress responsivity and emotional reactivity during
pubertal maturation: implications for psychopathology. Dev. Psychopathol. 21,
87–97. doi: 10.1017/S0954579409000066
Steinberg, L. (2008). A social neuroscience perspective on adolescent risk-taking.
Dev. Rev. 2, 78–106. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2007.08.002
Telzer, E. H., Fuligni, A. J., Lieberman, M. D., and Galván, A. (2013).
Ventral striatum activation to prosocial rewards predicts longitudinal
declines in adolescent risk taking. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 3, 45–52. doi:
10.1016/j.dcn.2012.08.004
Tirassa, M. (1999). Communicative competence and the architecture of the
mind/brain. Brain Lang. 68, 419–441. doi: 10.1006/brln.1999.2121
Tirassa, M., and Bosco, F. M. (2008). “On the nature and role of intersubjectivity
in human 1103 communication,” in Emerging Communication: Studies in New
Technologies and Practices in Communication, 10, 81–95.
Tirassa, M., Bosco, F. M., and Colle, L. (2006a). Rethinking the ontogeny of
mindreading. Conscious. Cogn. 15, 197–217. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2005.06.005
Tirassa, M., Bosco, F. M., and Colle, L. (2006b). Sharedness and
privateness in human early social life. Cogn. Syst. Res. 7, 128–139. doi:
10.1016/j.cogsys.2006.01.002
Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Tomasello, M., and Vaish, A. (2013). Origins of human cooperation and morality.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 64, 231–255. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812
Valle, A., Massaro, D., Castelli, I., and Marchetti, A. (2015). Theory of
mind development in adolescence and early adulthood: the growing
complexity of recursive thinking ability. Eur. J. Psychol. 11, 112–124. doi:
10.5964/ejop.v11i1.829
van Os, J., and Kapur, S. (2009). Schizophrenia. Lancet 374, 635–645. doi:
10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60995-8
Vetter, N. C., Altgassen, M., Phillips, L., Mahy, C. E., and Kliegel, M. (2013).
Development of affective theory of mind across adolescence: disentangling
the role of executive functions. Dev. Neuropsychol. 38, 114–125. doi:
10.1080/87565641.2012.733786
Viner, R. M., Ozer, E. M., Denny, S., Marmot, M., Resnick, M., Fatusi, A., et
al. (2012). Adolescence and the social determinants of health. Lancet 379,
1641–1652. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60149-4
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978).Mind in Society: The Psychology of Higher Mental Functions.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Walker, E. F., Sabuwalla, Z., and Huot, R. (2004). Pubertal neuromaturation,
stress sensitivity, and psychopathology. Dev. Psychopathol. 16, 807–824. doi:
10.1017/S0954579404040027
Weil, L. G., Fleming, S. M., Dumontheil, I., Kilford, E. J., Weil, R. S., Rees, G., et
al. (2013). The development of metacognitive ability in adolescence. Conscious.
Cogn. 22, 264–271. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.01.004
Wellman, H. M., and Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of theory-of-mind tasks. Child Dev. 75,
523–541. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00691.x
WHO. (2009). Global Health Risks: Mortality and Burden of Disease Attributable to
Selected Major Risks. Geneva: World Health Organization.
WHO. (2015). Schizophrenia. Available at: http://www.who.int/mental_health/
management/schizophrenia/en [accessed June 6, 2015].
Willoughby, T., Good, M., Adachi, P. J., Hamza, C., and Tavernier, R. (2013).
Examining the link between adolescent brain development and risk taking
from a social–developmental perspective. Brain Cogn. 83, 315–323. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2013.09.008
Wimmer, H. M., and Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: representation and
constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding
of deception. Cognition 13, 103–128. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(83)
90004-5
Wolf, L. K., Wright, N. D., Kilford, E. J., Raymond, E. J., Dolanb, J., and Blakemore,
S. J. (2013). Developmental changes in effects of risk and valence on adolescent
decision-making. Cogn. Dev. 28, 290–299. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2013.
04.001
Wrzus, C., Hänel, M., Wagner, J., and Neyer, F. J. (2013). Social network changes
and life events across the life span: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 139, 53–80.
doi: 10.1037/a0028601
Conflict of Interest Statement:TheReviewerTuulaM.Hurtig declares that, despite
being affiliated to the same institution as the author Ilaria Gabbatore, the review
process was handled objectively and no conflict of interest exists. The authors
declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or
financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Brizio, Gabbatore, Tirassa and Bosco. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 101112
